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ABSTRACT
For a long time most philosophers and some 
psychologists  sought  to  understand  emotions 
in terms of the thoughts they characteristically 
involve.  Recent  achievements  in  neuroscience 
and  experimental  psychology  have  encour-
aged  radical  change:  it  has  become  easier  to 
see emotions as essentially visceral experiences 
that are sometimes flanked by thoughts at one 
remove but are sometimes quite unmediated by 
thought.  The  neophysiological  understanding 
of emotion has started to attract philosophers, 
who have sharpened its theoretical claims and 
extended its reach. The primary reliance now in 
understanding emotions must be on science and 
therefore  on  its  investigative  format  and  pre-
ferred vocabulary. In this paper I will contend 
that this approach to emotion carries costs, that 
while revealing much it also, and inevitably, ob-
scures much. Indeed, some of the aspects of the 
emotional life that it pushes towards oblivion 
are ones that we should most care about.
Key  words:  emotion,  science,  feeling  theory, 
embodiment, intentionality
“His melancholy, which was settling into a sec-
ondary stage, like a healing wound, had in it a 
certain acrid, palatable sweetness.”
Henry James, The American




or a long time most philosophers and 
some psychologists sought to under-
stand emotions in terms of the thoughts 
they characteristically involve. This pre-
occupation  with  emotional  cognition 
sometimes  stretched  to  identifying  the 
content  of  emotions  with  the  thoughts 
characteristic of them, with the latter as-
sumed to be beliefs and judgments on the 
affected person’s part, e.g., that a thing I 
fear poses a threat to me. Critics often 
complained that this picture of emotion 
was overly cerebral; and the response was 
to tinker with the conception of the kind 
of  cognitions  that  emotions  were  sup-
posed to be, or to supplement cognition 
with a flanking hedonic attitude of some 
kind. Recent achievements in neurosci-
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    159.942:1 ence and experimental psychology have encouraged radical change: it has become 
easier to see emotions as essentially visceral experiences that are sometimes flanked 
by thoughts at one remove but are sometimes quite unmediated by thought. Bolstered 
especially by recent work in neuroscience, notably that of J.E. LeDoux and A. Dama-
sio1, the idea that emotion is the experience of physiological change has been reborn. 
In the form originally proposed by James and Lange, this idea lay, it seemed, comfort-
ably buried under familiar arguments with which cognitivists liked to preface their 
work—arguments which now look too simple.
The neophysiological understanding of emotion has also started to attract philoso-
phers, who have sharpened its theoretical claims and extended its reach. The former 
happens in Jesse Prinz’s Gut Reactions (Prinz 2004), which offers a carefully crafted 
invitation to return to physiology. The latter is done in Jenefer Robinson’s Deeper than 
Reason (Robinson 2005), which applies the theory to the arts. Between them, these 
books serve, so to speak, to articulate the paradigm. For what is offered is more than a 
change in emphasis in what emotions are conceived to be. The change is also one of the 
method, the concepts, and the language to be employed in understanding that massive, 
intimate and yet elusive part of ourselves, our emotional being. The primary reliance 
now in understanding emotions must be on science and therefore on its investigative 
format and preferred vocabulary. In this paper I will contend that this approach to 
emotion carries costs, that while revealing much it also, and inevitably, obscures much. 
Indeed, some of the aspects of the emotional life that it pushes towards oblivion are 
ones that we should most care about.
1. Embodiment: restoring the somatic sounding board 
I will begin by outlining a picture of emotional response that many see emerging from 
the recent strides in experimental psychology and especially brain science. I will then 
consider a few of its features in more detail. 
At least some emotion-types recognized in folk-psychology have distinct physiologi-
cal realisations2. At present this is known in only a few cases, and it would be wrong to 
expect the emotional palette we recognise and have canonised in our vocabulary ever 
to be neatly plotted in our neuro-motor economy, but there seem to be basic emotions 
out of which others are confected, sometimes by culture3; and these might admit of 
mapping4. The physiology in question is bewilderingly diverse, but it appears to be 
distributed along a surface-to-depth axis. That is, the bodily changes that occur in the 
1  See especially LeDoux 1996, Damasio 2000.  See especially LeDoux 1996, Damasio 2000.
2  Robinson 2005, pp. �2-�4.  Robinson 2005, pp. �2-�4.
3  See, for instance Ekman 1999, Prinz 2004, ch. 4.  See, for instance Ekman 1999, Prinz 2004, ch. 4.
4  Prinz 2004, ch. 4-6.  Prinz 2004, ch. 4-6.
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course of an emotional response may be deeply internal (seated in the brain, especially 
in various of its subcortical regions); or they can be closer to the surface and visceral (as 
in changing endocrine levels); or they can manifest at the surface in expressive changes 
of the body, notably (but not exclusively) in the face, a veritable repository of emotional 
information which allows us to discern that and how a person is “all worked up”. A 
response may involve connected physiological events at all of these levels. Accordingly, 
changes at these levels are partially integrated into “affect programmes”. There is two-
way traffic in an affect programme: if one mimes the surface bodily responses, i.e., the 
physiognomy and gestures characteristic of a particular type of emotion, such as anger 
or fear, the changes in the deeper layers that normally issue in these manifestations are 
themselves awakened. And so an affect programme allows one to induce inward feel-
ings of that emotion5. 
It is important, however, that the core changes can also be produced in the absence 
of any of the usual input from the body’s periphery and viscera. The brain itself can 
provide its emotion initiator centres with facsimilies of the input that normally arrives 
from the rest of the body. Antonio Damasio has called this the “as if body loop”: 
…the  body  landscape  is  changed  and  is  subsequently  represented  in 
somatosensory structures of the central nervous system, from the brain stem 
on up. The change in the representation of the body landscape can be partly 
achieved by another mechanism, which involves the “as if body loop.” In this 
alternate mechanism, the representation of body-related changes is created 
directly in sensory body maps, under the control of other neural sites, for 
instance, in the pre-frontal cortices. It is “as if” the body had really been 
changed, but it has not. The “as if body loop” mechanism bypasses the body 
proper, partially or entirely…The “as if” mechanisms are not only important 
for emotion and feeling, but also for a class of cognitive processes one might 
designate as “internal simulation.” (Damasio 2000, p. 284)
Prinz cites this to save the physiological theory of emotion from the traditional ob-
jection to William James that often there just isn’t any visceral excitement or surface 
eruption (such as crying) that one experiences when experiencing an emotion (such 
as sadness) (Prinz 2004, p. 5�).The counter-claim is that in emotional arousal, virtual 
visceral excitation can stand in for (missing) real visceral excitation. The “as if bodily 
loop” emotion allows emotion to reside in an internal “appearance” of bodily changes 
even when there are none. In this sense, it is indeed no longer quite true to claim, as Pe-
ter Hacker does in his discussion of the experimental study of emotion, that “One can 
feel an emotion E without any E-type perturbation” (Hacker 2004, p. 206). This would 
seem, however, to have an important but little noted consequence: that the sufficiency 
for emotion of central arousal via the “as if body loop” reveals that the only physiology 
5  See Robinson 2005, p. 36, and Ekman 1984, pp. 324-8.  See Robinson 2005, p. 36, and Ekman 1984, pp. 324-8.actually necessary to the formation of emotions, and therefore the only candidate for 
being identical with these, are those deeper quickenings in the brain’s affective cores.6 
That is, the manifest physical trademarks of emotion (glaring, gasping, blanching, be-
ing tongue-tied, etc.) are actually not the necessary physical levels of emotion responses, 
however revealing, well-worn, and indispensable to the social aspects of the emotional 
life they may be. But if palpable peripheral responses are not necessary to emotional 
arousal, then even when manifest peripheral arousal is present (the person is overtly 
“worked up”), the emotion itself, as distinct from these reverberations, is still actually 
realised in the brain. The physiological approach to emotion is stranger than it looks.
Yet it is also open to question whether emotion should be identified even with the kinds 
of event that constitute its physiological core. Such an assumption would be obviously 
unsound in the case of other mental phenomena. Consider mathematical thoughts. 
Deep somatic processes, this time cortical, presumably also form the vehicle of math-
ematical thought and are necessary and sufficient, in us, for solving mathematical 
problems. But no strictly physiological description of what happens as a mathematical 
problem is solved could, on its own, entail or be translated into a perspicuous descrip-
tion of the reasoning to the solution of that problem. Still less could such a description 
be the content of its solution. No depiction of a neuro-chemical processing, as such, 
however finely drawn, could rank as a proof of a theorem. We might learn a lot about 
the brain from studying maths (e.g., that it is non-algorithmic); but we couldn’t learn 
maths by studying the brain, if that was all we had to start with. Neurology couldn’t 
replace maths. On the contrary, when a neural process occurs by which a mathematical 
thought is entertained, the content of that thought lies not in what the process is but in 
what the thought achieved through this process represents, e.g., that the circumfer-
ence of a circle = 2 πr. (And the same thought might be realisable by processes and in 
mediums of quite different kinds, not just neural.) Now, one feature emotions share 
with mathematical thoughts is that of representing something. Emotions also appraise 
what they represent, and bodily feelings often loom large in this. The question, then, is 
whether emotive representing and appraising of elements of the world that affect our 
interests might consist in somatic changes. I turn, accordingly, to the idea that emo-
tions are “embodied appraisals” as set out by Jesse Prinz (Prinz 2004, ch. 3). For this 
theory precisely denies that emotions represent and appraise by incorporating propo-
sitional attitudes. 
6  Not, as Robinson, for instance, suggests, in the rest of the body, “When—at the sight of my lost 2-year-  Not, as Robinson, for instance, suggests, in the rest of the body, “When—at the sight of my lost 2-year- “When—at the sight of my lost 2-year-
old toddling towards me out of the crowd—I respond by running towards him, crying out, gasping, laughing, 
trembling, and turning white, in a heady mixture of fear and joy, that set of gestures, behaviour, and physiological 
responses is my emotional response” (Robinson 2005, p. 36).
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2. The body resounding
I will examine some of the central tenets of this theory that feed the disquiet I feel about 
it. I hope my renditions remain accurate despite the necessary omission of the meticu-
lous elaboration that Prinz provides.
The first claim to notice is methodological. Philosophy is admonished to mend its easy, 
free-wheeling ways in discussing this area of the philosophy of mind (and presum-
ably other areas, perhaps all). Left to themselves, we are told, philosophers tend to rely 
heavily, indeed almost exclusively, on “intuition”, i.e., on reflective examination of what 
it seems right or necessary to say about a given case. This appeal may be to linguistic 
constraints or to introspection. Prinz observes that
Philosophical arguments for cognitive theories often rely on modal intuitions. 
A philosopher will insist that guilt just cannot occur without thinking about 
the self and anger cannot occur without judging that someone has delivered 
an insult. These assertions are based on intuitions. The philosopher will first 
try to imagine cases of emotion occurring without a particular concept or 
propositional attitude. If no case comes to mind, she will stipulate that the link 
between the emotion and that concept or propositional attitude is analytic. 
It  is  a  conceptual  truth  that  guilt  presupposes  the  a  concept  of  the  self.   
(Prinz 2004, p. 28)
Prinz thinks that there is every reason to distrust such intuitive reflection together with 
the conceptual truths they seem to yield, the very stock and trade of philosophy.� For, 
intuitions can conflict from one person to another. Intuitions often reflect (limited) 
personal experience or inherited folk psychology. These are corrigible in ways that are 
often hidden to those who are immersed in them. So this sort of probing for logical 
structure in psychology is best minimized in favour of less deceptive and more testable 
forms of enquiry, ones which could yield sounder generalities: “If one wants to explain 
something other than one’s own personal beliefs, one should exploit more objective 
methods” (Prinz 2004, p. 29). The authority, and with it the enterprise, of “conceptual 
analysis” is a broken reed. Reflection and testimony may have a necessary part to play 
in emotion research, as when subjects are asked to identify their emotions or the emo-
tions they would attribute to others in specified settings. But these reports that feed the 
experimental processes should not be made to bear too much weight, let alone all of it. 
(And they do seem usually confined to rather simple classificatory jobs.) 
For Prinz, these methodological strictures, together with other arguments (see Prinz 
2004, chapter 2), have a material consequence: we should abandon the notion that 
�  ThischallengesPeterHacker’spresumption,whichmanyphilosopherswoulddoubtlessliketoendorse,thatthe  This challenges Peter Hacker’s presumption, which many philosophers would doubtless like to endorse, that the 
task of philosophy “is to describe the conceptual structures in terms of which we articulate our experience and its 
objects”, Hacker 2004, p. 199.emotions have conceptual content (and therefore conceptual conditions) waiting for 
us to sit back and tease out intuitively. Instead, the relation of types of emotion to the 
conditions in which they arise is extensional. That is, the ways in which different kinds 
of emotion align with the world are ultimately empirical and could have been different 
(they reflect contingencies of natural history):
Let’s assume dogs lack a concept of the self. Now imagine a dog who hangs its 
head down low after making a mess on the carpet. Is it conceptually impossible 
that the dog is ashamed? I don’t think so. The most we can infer from the fact 
that emotions are organized into different classes is that emotions arise under 
different  classes  of  situations.  Some  emotions  arise  under  circumstances 
having to do with the self; but it doesn’t follow that they require or contain a 
self-concept. (Prinz 2004, p. 28)
Since the relation of thoughts to emotions is not conceptual, it must presumably be 
primarily causal. On this view, emotional responses may be initiated by the person’s 
thoughts about what is happening to him but they do not comprise these thoughts. 
And emotions may also be initiated by other stimuli, such as perceptual images or 
chemicals. Emotions themselves do not have the structure of propositional attitudes, 
which incorporate that-clauses.
Prinz’s concept of emotions as embodied appraisals arises against this background. 
More particularly, it is an attempt to secure a physiological understanding of emotion 
against a major difficulty in Damasio’s theory. Prinz proposes what might be called an 
outward-facing view of embodied appraisal. Damasio draws attention to the fact that 
formations in the brain known to initiate many emotions are also receptors of signals 
from the body indicating the state of the various organ systems, as well as being recep-
tors of perceptual information about external happenings (the amygdala being the best 
known). Study of these connections has led Damasio to the belief that emotions are a 
way of perceiving changes in ensembles of internal organs and processes as they re-
spond to what we are encountering in the world. We experience a few of these physical 
changes directly, such as increased pulse and breathing rates in anger, but most are not 
overt to us in this way, such as the endocrinal changes behind the pulse and breathing 
rates and certainly the activity in brain regions. Emotions are said to be these deeper 
neural configurations, which are the somatic shadows of the impinging world. Mak-
ing these the locus of emotional responses, again, offers to circumvent the traditional 
objection to physiological conceptions of emotion: that we can experience (lots of) 
emotions even where there is no experience of overt bodily perturbations, when the 
body feels to us perfectly quiet. We are wrong to think this. Plenty of otherwise mute 
but measurable and distinctive physiology co-occurs with every emotional response. 
From this, Damasio concludes that
12
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Feeling an emotion is a simple matter. It consists of having mental images 
arising from the neural patterns which represent the changes in body and 
brain that make up an emotion. (Damasio 2000, p. 280, my italics)
Damasio even holds that our notion that emotions are diaphanous states somehow 
focused on the extra-bodily world (on such things as my life, your remark, honour, his 
craven betrayal) is quaintly deluded
The alleged vagueness, elusiveness, and intangibility of emotions and feelings 
is…an indication of how we cover the representation of our bodies, of how 
much mental imagery based on nonbody objects and events masks the reality 
of the body. Otherwise we would easily know that the emotions and feelings 
are tangibly about the body. Sometimes we use our minds to hide a part of our 
beings from another part of our beings. (Damasio 2000, p. 29)
The assumption here seems to be that because emotions are realised in a cascade of 
physiological events, these events are what the emotions are about. (Presumably this 
would have to apply equally to mathematical thoughts, scientific beliefs, and moral 
judgments.) Yet this is a fundamental distortion of the intentionality of emotion, of a 
type that Peter Hacker brings out well:
One’s blush of shame does not inform one of the state of one’s facial arteries, 
although it may inform one that one is more ashamed than one thought, and 
one’s tears of grief do not inform one of the state of one’s lachrymal glands, 
although they may inform one that one loved Daisy more than one thought. 
(Hacker 2004, p. 200)
What  a  person  is  proud  of  may  be  his  achievements,  lineage,  children, 
possessions, etc., but not any somatic changes that may occur when he thinks 
of them. What a person feels guilty about are his wrongdoings, not any bodily 
perturbations that may occur when he thinks about them….One is indignant 
at A’s action because it is unjust, not because one flushes in anger when 
one hears of it. One knows it to be unjust because it rides roughshod over 
someone’s rights, not because one flushes in anger. Indeed, the flush is only a 
flush of anger in so far as one is thus indignant… my tears of grief may make 
me realize how much I loved Daisy. Far from one’s emotions informing one 
about the state of one’s body, the state of one’s body informs one about one’s 
emotions. (Hacker 2004, pp. 204-5)
Now, Jess Prinz’s notion of “embodied appraisal” can be seen as an attempt to circum-
vent this sort of objection. He seeks to preserve the idea that emotions are really physi-
cal events but without Damasio’s implausibly reductive corporeal solipsism with regard to their content, which Prinz himself deems “a strange hypothesis”.8 The world and our 
relations to it must figure somehow in the content of emotions, even where the latter 
is understood physically rather than cognitively. Couldn’t we, Prinz asks, “accept the 
premise that emotions are bodily perceptions” whilst insisting “that emotions detect 
something more than the vicissitudes of vasculature”?9
A delicate task. Here is how Prinz proposes to execute it (Prinz 2004, pp. 60-9). When 
something is represented, the nominal content of the representation can be an appear-
ance of the real content (or essence) of what is represented. Thus, the nominal content 
of our normal representation of dog might be something like: “furry, panting barker” 
(my example). Similarly, emotions represent their themes of concern (e.g., danger, loss, 
success) only via their appearances, not by their essences. They track their themes but 
without describing them (they are not “essence detectors”). They track real essences, but 
only in terms of more superficial nominal content. What happens is that the relevant 
impinging emotive themes (relational properties affecting personal well-being, includ-
ing thoughts about these) cause dedicated reactions in the body, and these somatic 
echoes of what is bearing in from outside the body are the nominal content of the emo-
tions we then feel. The emotions are reactions to the somatic echoes and are themselves 
neural states, generated in the brain. The somatic upheavals are the print of external 
events, the form in which these events appear within (to?) the body. The emotion “rep-
resents” impinging events (the real content) in terms of these appearances (the nomi-
nal content) just as we “represent” (track) dogs by appearances such as “furry, panting 
barker” rather than in terms of canine DNA, which is the dog’s essence, or as we rep-
resent the sun in terms of its being a hot, luminous ball in the sky or of its being the 
god Aton, rather than in terms of the nuclear processes in its core, in which its starry 
essence actually consists. So do emotions “represent” the world (and thus they have the 
right sort of aboutness), but at one remove (i.e., via nominal content) and not as it is (so 
that they are not descriptive and not cognitions fitted out with cognitive content).
What is strange about this model is how very opaque it leaves the emotions them-
selves. This is a double opacity which occurs at both levels of emotional representation 
(i.e., representation of world and of internal body state), though, importantly, this is 
concealed by how the theory is presented. First, an emotion “represents” the worldly 
theme which “it is set up to be set off by” but without describing it (Prinz 2004, p. 65). 
And this is because, secondly, the “appearance” of the emotion’s worldly theme (its 
nominal content) in the shape of proprietary visceral and neural reverberations is not 
actually descriptive of that theme either. Notice, by contrast, that properties such as 
“furry, panting barker” and “dazzling ball in the sky” are directly present to us: even if 
not essences, they are descriptive, and as such obtrude into experience. It is here that we 
can see how misleading is the picture of representation that comes with the embodied 
8  See Prinz’s comment on Damasio, Prinz 2004, p. 5�.  See Prinz’s comment on Damasio, Prinz 2004, p. 5�.
9  See especially Prinz 2004, ch. 3.  See especially Prinz 2004, ch. 3.
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appraisal view of emotion. For the supposed nominal content of emotion envisaged 
by this theory, the rise in hormone levels, changes in the subcortical areas of the brain 
and much of the rest of the deep physiology of emotional response through which we 
are said to track the emotion’s theme, are not descriptively present to us when we are 
emotionally affected; they do not reveal themselves to us but are inaccessible. In this 
they differ crucially from the nominal content of dog or sun. To avoid this problem, 
the theory would have to rest all its weight on the fact that there are palpable physi-
cal changes variously characteristic of emotional responses, as their nominal content: 
heart palpitation in fear, heavy breathing in anger, raised eyebrows in astonishment and 
so much else. Yet these obtrusive somatic travails, it is admitted by all, while frequent 
are not actually necessary either to all types of emotion (serenity, nostalgia, quiet sad-
ness) nor to all episodes of the types of emotion that can feature them. And the deep 
processes necessary to the emotions and their surface eruptions—the tectonics and 
magma, so to speak—are, again, as remote from experience or reflection as can be. (It 
takes objective methods, such as scanning, to monitor the amygdala and its brethren; 
and not even Damasio would suppose scanning to be part of feeling any emotion.) 
I suggest that if we wanted to apply the distinction between apparent (nominal) and 
real (essential) content of emotions, its correct application would be as follows. When 
an emotion is experienced, the feelings, imagery, and thoughts that flood in then, and 
whatever palpable and witnessable bodily arousals there are, together with any behav-
iour (such as exclaiming, recoiling, sharply fixing or averting attention), constitute the 
appearance (nominal content) of the deeper, concealed somatic emotional processes. 
The real content tracked by these manifestations that we find in ourselves are the silent, 
internal neurochemical perturbations of the central nervous system. That is how the 
analogies of the relation of furriness to canine DNA or of sunshine to nuclear processes 
in the solar core translate for the relation of nominal to essential content of emotion 
events. These experiences are the glass through which the internal state of the body, 
not the worldly theme of emotive concern, shows itself darkly. But that seems very like 
Damasio’s position! In other words, Prinz’s attempt at introducing the external world 
by appealing to the distinction between nominal and essential kinds of representation 
must slip back into the somatic solipsism it was meant to overcome. The relation of 
emotions to the world (i.e., to their themes) is not a transposed version of the relation 
between the manifest aspects of emotional responses and their visceral undersides. 
Notice that the double opacity of emotions, when they are understood in Prinz’s way, 
flows directly from the general claim, noted earlier, that the tie between given emotion-
types and given sorts of environmental circumstances is merely extensional, fixed only 
by established patterns of cooccurence. For it was just because an emotion was not an 
“essence detector” that it could be paired up with just any circumstance that happened 
to attend it. This would indeed mean that emotions themselves lack conceptual content. 
But that returns us to the problem with Damasio’s model: most emotions are not about 
our bodies at all, much less about the body’s more arcane internal workings, and they would be grotesquely maladaptive if they were, capturing our attention just when we 
needed to cope, often quickly, with the slings and arrows of the surrounding world. 
Note, too, that the bodily feelings of which we are sensible in emotive arousal, as in 
fear or anger, seem world-directed rather than body-directed. Yet even these do not ac-
count for the full content of the emotions in question. For the world-directedness of the 
bodily feelings on their own is apt to be narrowly referential and thus too unspecific: 
these feelings just register a source in the world for what we are feeling. As Peter Goldie 
puts it in distinguishing bodily feelings from “feeling towards” in emotion, “Bodily 
feelings alone cannot reveal to you what your emotion is about…the most they can 
reveal is that you are feeling an emotion about something or other, which has a certain 
determinable property” (Goldie 2002).
Thus, it still isn’t clear how, or whether, the idea of somatic appraisal could do justice to 
the intentionality of emotion.
3. Aboutness and content
Representing changes in the body (by tracking them) does not secure the focus on the 
world of which emotions seem clearly capable. What, then, does? We can approach 
this by assessing the pure extensionality claim. This was the claim that emotion-world 
ties that strike common understanding as so perspicuous and inevitable (fear-to-harm, 
hope-to-deliverance, etc.) are just embedded empirical alignments and can be under-
stood by empirical study of the natural and social contingencies that have aligned them 
in the ways so familiar to us. (Recall that this was why “intuition” was deemed too 
naïve and ensnaring a methodology.) In contrast to cognitive theories of emotion, the 
embodied appraisal view holds that the relation of an emotion to its object or theme of 
concern is causal. This would follow from the claim that their tie is ultimately external 
and empirical: “Associative learning can probably forge a link between emotions and 
any perceptual experience that occurs in conjunction with them.” (Prinz 2004, p. �5) 
Once thus linked, perceptions of the given kind and such appropriate thoughts as we 
may have about them will “trigger” the entrenched emotional responses. 
Now, let us recognise that such mechanisms are possible but ask whether this is all 
there is to the relation of emotion to world? Obviously no type of creature could evolve 
to find joy in unmitigated personal calamity (unless they also found joy aversive); they 
wouldn’t last a generation. But quite apart from being dysfunctional, it isn’t clear how 
what unmitigated calamity is could be comprehensibly—one wants to add, sanely—
greeted with the attitude that joy is: how the undoing of all one most cares about could 
possibly be viewed as an uplifting consummation of goodness? The vectors of care and 
goodness clash puzzlingly here. In saying this am I just appealing here to something 
like conceptual intuition (thus begging the question in dispute)? Not quite. I think 
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the presence of a conceptual connection here can be defended. Is it really plausible to 
claim that one’s bafflement at the idea of joyous agonised ruin merely reflects a lack of 
any exposure to that correlation? If that were all, then any kind of emotion could come 
to be elicited by any kind of circumstance. But for all emotion to lend itself equally to 
any circumstance, emotion would need always to be much the same. For if emotions 
distinguished themselves into distinct kinds, some would fit a given kind of circum-
stance better than others. In other words, if all emotions were equally accessible in all 
circumstances, then there couldn’t really be distinctive types of emotion. There would 
be a kind of anything-goes-emotional-monism, AGEM for short. Now, if AGEM were 
true and emotion was homogenous in all circumstances (a kind of psychic white noise), 
emotional response could serve no discernable function beyond general excitation. Or, 
at most, there might be just one distinction dividing emotional states, that of good-
to-have and not-good-to-have, positive versus negative motivating valence. But that 
is nothing like what we do have; and Prinz himself rejects the thesis that emotional 
valence is a sui generis experience and holds that valence comes down to the specific 
ways in which different kinds of emotional experience are good or bad10, and I agree 
with him about this. I conclude that AGEM is nothing like what we have and therefore 
that there are types of emotion marked by features that fit them respectively more to 
one kind of circumstance than to another (thus giving a certain purchase to intuitions 
about this after all). 
Given that there is a diversity of emotion kinds, there seems no reason we should not 
be capable of recognizing the consonances and dissonances between our emotions and 
their eliciting circumstances (e.g., the presence of something menacing, as opposed to 
benign, in what I fear). It is true that in the case of some token emotion experiences the 
tie of an emotion to what it is about is not immediately recognisable. In these situations, 
one’s emotional response is opaque in the sense that one cannot identify precisely what 
it is about the particular object of this response that elicits (or justifies) this response. 
One may be uneasy, intimidated, sexually excited, or in love where one cannot at first 
(or perhaps ever) quite see why. And one may be compelled to probe the source of one’s 
response by tests, e.g., by focusing on particular features of the person in question or 
imagining certain features were different, in the attempt to see what “clicks”. Mostly, 
however, this is not necessary. Moreover, the very ability sometimes finally to work 
out what one is finding in another where that does not show through immediately, 
strongly suggests two things. First, that emotions can represent descriptively. One can 
see what it is about a thing that calls for one sort of emotion more than an another. 
Second, that this is a matter of degree: sometimes, indeed often, we recognise clearly 
what answers to an emotion we feel (my affronted feeling answers to your insult). There 
is much room for the reflective exploration of one’s emotions and their relations to the 
world. Emotions represent relations with the world and in doing this they are to some 
10  Prinz 2004, pp. 1�6-1�8.  Prinz 2004, pp. 1�6-1�8.extent descriptive. Clearly, emotions also involve appraisals of what they represent, un-
like such embodied and valenced reactions as tickles. I contend that emotive appraisals 
are also descriptive and are inseparable from the descriptive content that distinguishes 
emotions from one another. 
To appreciate this let us consider the hardest cases, the primitive (“unthinking”) reflex-
like emotional reactions. There are, we have noted, well-known emotional responses 
which are strikingly direct and pre-empt interpretation or conceptualisation of what 
is happening. They are typified by the “fast, dirty” fear responses that are routed from 
the sensory receptors straight through the amygdala and thence into immediate bodily 
mobilisation, initially bypassing the cortical areas. These are hard-wired reactions to 
the bare appearance of certain shapes, textures, etc. Any sight with the vague configura-
tion of a snake or sudden exposure to height are familiar examples. The physiognomy 
of cute creatures or the proprietary sights, odours or textures of disgust can provoke 
similar irresistibly spontaneous reactions. But while the perceptual input to these reac-
tions may consist in the sheer geometry of snake shape, or in the very sight of plunging 
depths, or in tactile or olfactory qualities (such as sliminess or sickly odour), I suggest 
there is actually more to the immediate feelings with which one reacts than just the 
awareness of these as bare perceptual values. The ways we feel at such junctures have 
content, content that is palpable, various and distinctive. Thus, a wave of horror (not 
of relief or of mellowness) greets the snakish shape as one gasps and recoils; the sight, 
smell or texture of what disgusts and repels is found loathsome; one finds a certain 
physiognomy adorable. These contents of affective psychology are every bit as salient 
and integral to the response as the coocurring somatic commotion. Even in these sim-
ple, undeliberated emotions, the objects are clothed in affective properties, properties 
such as hideous, yucky, sweet. The savour is in the flavour, not subsequent to it. It is these 
affective qualities that one learns to detach from the encounter with those very same 
geometries, sights, and sensations if one develops as a herpetologist, rock climber or 
medical student. Even in the case of sensory qualities, let alone in the case of emotional 
responses involving thought and insight, the encounter with an emotively sensitive 
item will only precipitate an emotional response if the item gets cast in suitably evoca-
tive terms. My view that a particular refusal of yours amounts to cowardice only passes 
from cool judgment into contempt when I also find your refusal pathetic or craven. (To 
imagine how it could seem pathetic or craven is to imagine finding it contemptible, i.e., 
despising it.) Whether emotion develops about something depends on what we make 
of it. To receive it in emotive terms is for emotion to have begun. That, too, can happen 
in primordial form, as fast as you please.
These emotive representations are what Robert Roberts has called “construals” (Rob-
erts 1988, 2002). They are not indeed cognitive in that they needn’t be the objects of 
propositional attitudes, especially belief, but can take the form of images (the look on 
his face, that tone to his voice), and they may be within the capabilities of animals 
(Roberts 1996). No description in physiological terms (including the physiology that 
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sustains the formation of construals) can capture their meaning. Yet, construals admit 
of fine shading and sometimes of considerable elaboration (as in a love sonnet, for 
example). It is in their terms that we can explore and get closest to the fuller identity of 
our emotions, which may include what differentiates two experiences of emotion of the 
same general type, or to trace modulations in the experience of an emotion. And they 
allow a more natural account of precognitive appraisals by emotion.
4. Fittingness
The embodied appraisal conception of emotion offers to account not only for appraisal 
by emotion but also for the appraisal of emotion. How does this fare? Emotions are 
viewed as perceptions of bodily states, and the sort of faults for which emotions can 
be criticised, it is held, resemble the faults that perceptions can have: making mistakes 
where one is equipped not to make those mistakes. Thus, Prinz claims that “emotions 
can be thought of as conclusions to arguments” (Prinz 2004, p. 23�). In particular, “there 
are two places for normativity to get a foothold in our emotional responses. We can be 
held responsible for having emotions based on bad premises or bad inferences, pro-
vided we are responsible for those premises and inferences” (Prinz 2004, p. 239). Sally 
is proud of being prettier than Jane. But actually she isn’t prettier, as would be obvious 
if she took a good look. Prinz calls this lack of premise warrant. Obviously, Sally takes 
pride in looks. But looks are largely involuntary attributes rather than achievements, 
and pride is warranted only for things that can be and have been achieved. (Which, 
by the way, seems awfully like a conceptual claim.) Sally would realise this if only she 
reflected. This is termed lack of inference warrant. Normativity in emotion consists in 
these two sorts of warrant. 
Does it really? A person living in a certain culture might correctly believe himself to 
have done certain things (e.g., swung lots of sharp deals). Moreover, according to all the 
rules and reinforcements available to him now and ever since he was young – he has 
grown up in the bosom of a mafia culture – sharp dealing is a virtue. He does not suffer 
lack of premise warrant. So he, thus warranted, prides himself on his achievements. He 
does not lack inference warrant. 
Now, unfortunately, none of this seems to me to rule out the following: the things in 
which he has innocently learned to take pride are just unworthy of it. He is misguided, 
but not in accepting the premises he has accepted or in making the inferences he has 
made. And the fault here is more than one of being inadvertently misguided. His grasp 
of worthiness certainly was at fault, and that might be a lack of premise warrant. But ad-
ditionally and distinctly, pride of the sort is shoddy and debased, whether this is realised 
or not. Were he to graduate to a better understanding of worthiness, he would look back 
on his early self-congratulation not simply as maladroit (and embarrassing) but as base 
(and shaming). Were he to take refuge in the thought that he hadn’t known better, that could fault him anew. He would see himself as having been not just clumsy but corrupt. 
Emotions can have normative features that depend on the relation of what they are to the 
nature of what they are about. And these normative properties do not belong at all to the 
bodily changes that occur in emotional responses. As Hacker puts it, 
Given appropriate circumstances, we can say that someone ought to, and has 
good reason to, feel proud or ashamed, but we cannot say that he ought to 
raise his pulse-rate or increase his psychogalvanic reflex reactions. (Hacker 
2004, p. 206)
5. Methodologies
I have been concerned so far with a conception of emotion, the embodied appraisal 
model, that issues in part from applying “objective methods” to the study of emotion. 
keeping in mind the reservations about these results outlined above, I now turn to this 
general approach itself. It is beyond dispute that the examination of emotion responses 
using the resources of brain science and experimental psychology has many intruiging 
(and potentially useful) lessons that are not otherwise available. This does not mean it 
has no limitations. I will focus here on two: (1) the risk of shallow generality and (2) of 
epistemic self-enclosure. 
1. There is often a marked contrast between the task of identifying emotions in the con-
text of experiments or surveys and understanding them through fuller reflection. Much 
emotion, of course, passes unmonitored. When recognition is sought, sometimes it is 
easy to say at once what is being felt by indicating the right slots in a ready-to-hand 
taxonomy (sad or angry?); and this suffices for some purposes. But often, emotions are 
quite difficult to understand at all edifyingly by means of brief taxonomic classification. 
Generic labelling may only be the start of what we want to know and needs open out 
into fine-grained probing. Consider this sentence from one of David Lodge’s novels: “I 
glimpsed the little metal stud gleaming in the dark hollow of her mouth, like a jewel 
in the forehead of a toad. There is something faintly reptilian about this young wom-
an—her impassivity, her repose, her unblinking gaze. No doubt I am just projecting 
my insecurity on to her.”11 Note the uncertainty of even the first person authority here. 
(Corrigibility is sometimes unavoidable.) Precisely what emotions toward this young 
woman are being evoked, in this insecurity, by construing her in this particular way? 
Not easy to say. Much specific context is needed. A realistic approach to emotional 
self-knowledge (let alone empathic understanding) needs to meet many challenges at 
this level. However, the bulk of the attention in emotion science seems to call mainly 
on the identification of emotions in specified stereotypical circumstances (e.g., pictures 
11  From Lodge 2001, p. 123.  From Lodge 2001, p. 123.
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of facial expressions). Surveys and experiments on statistically significant samples need 
to attend to what is general and comparable across the range of the phenomena being 
studied. And their results, when forthcoming, are impressive precisely for being thus 
evidence-based. Although still young, emotion science already permits important di-
agnostic discriminations. However, several things may tend systematically to elude this 
approach: the peculiarities of individual instances of emotion (that fear, this anger); or 
what is distinctive of a particular person’s emotion (my – curiously feeble—anger, your 
– always rather brittle – calm), qualities that can be distinctive and themselves impor-
tant. These may be, for example, the exigent themes of psychotherapeutic confessional 
or of perplexed self-probing. 
2. For some purposes, requests for the brief, clear-cut identification of tokens of types 
of emotion in a straightforward vocabulary, uniform in content across statistically 
significant samples, may be easily met and be all that is needed. By its very nature, 
however, the differentia that can colour tokens of emotion-types or subtypes, together 
with complex or subtle emotional unfoldings, may be occluded by this approach. But 
notice that whether, when, or how far this is so could not be determined by enquiry 
in this same format. No method can be used to see what it can’t see, and, therefore, to 
see whether there is anything it cannot see (much less to see what that is). “Objective” 
methods need simplified circumstances in which as many variables as possible can be 
eliminated, and even then what individuals make of their emotions are apt to be filtered 
through standardised questions.—These measures serve to sift for what is the same 
from case to case and are far removed from the free description of what is felt in many 
of the circumstances in which emotions are naturally experienced. The demonstrable 
successes such an approach can permit therefore are not a full measure of its adequacy. 
This method can’t be used to assess its own adequacy. No method can be used to reveal 
what it must omit. Cleaving to any single methodology (including, for that matter, the 
most Proustian self-reflection) generates the Rumsfeld problem: you don’t know what 
you don’t know.
It is, of course, true that even “intuitive” lay or philosophical reflection on emotion that 
does not avail itself of the controlled study of uniform responses often itself aspires to a 
certain generality. Are the more localised and involved features of emotional responses 
adverted to above likewise out of range of this sort of reflection? The claim above, that 
not all useful truths about emotions are quasi-nomological (necessary and sufficient 
conditions of responses across statistically significant samples), is not the claim that 
emotional experiences, closely viewed, are ultimately idiosyncratic or esoteric. That 
choice would reflect a poverty of alternatives. What kinds of generality can claims about 
emotions have? I suggest that the important distinction here, hinted at above, is between 
identifying descriptions of emotions and individuating descriptions of them. The first 
seek commonality, the second specificity. An interest in identification aspires to the no-
mological: e.g., what configuration of facial muscles accompanies and expresses which 
type of emotional excitation? Which kinds of fear (or other) response initially bypass higher cortical processing? This involves the identification of emotional responses as 
instances of types or subtypes under conditions that show their relations to attendant 
phenomena, such as perceptual contents or social contexts. This will sometimes be the 
pertinent level of truth: what matters is just that I am anxious or ashamed–home truths, 
so to speak (and anything further amounts to distraction and irresponsible navel-gaz-
ing). An account of an emotional response or disposition that individuates it, on the 
other hand, takes account not just of its type or subtype but of what may be distinctive 
about it. Shakespeare’s Sonnets are serviceable examples of an individuated accounts 
of emotion. They deal with refinements of emotion which are not usefully regarded 
as cases of widely surveyable types. The differentia of emotional responses or disposi-
tions may be an important expression of individual character, of personal psychological 
style and thus be vital to who an individual is, and their range of incidence may not be 
at all wide. What individuates occurrences of emotion also reflects the character and 
complexity of those parts of a person’s world that elicit his emotions. Emotions are not 
like atoms, effectively uniform instances of their types and subtypes. Nor are they like 
leaves or snowflakes, with no two quite alike, with real molar differences but not such 
as are normally very important. Emotions are more like (other) historical events: they 
may indeed fall into broad categories, such as revolution or recession, but some of what 
is important about each specimen is specific to it.
The features that individuate an emotional response cannot be exhaustively specified 
in advance of a given case and may not be uniform from case to case. They may in-
clude (1) phenomenological features, what the emotion feels like (as in the unfurling 
despair chronicled by William Styron in Darkness Visible12), (2) specifics of a particular 
relationship (e.g.,dismay at betrayal by a friend with whom one has had these bonds; 
delight in often elusive qualities of personality or style unique to a particular person), 
(3) other kinds of personal history (the charm of places that were scenes of certain 
childhood experiences), (4) qualities distinctive of particular objects of emotion that 
do not necessarily relate to oneself personally (the peculiar pity of that person’s death). 
The localised shapes that emotional experiences may have in virtue of such properties 
are not shared by all or even most other instances of emotions of the same generic 
types. That does not make them esoteric, however. They needn’t be incommunicable or 
logically private. They, or the susceptibility to them, will be shared to a degree, even by 
people who never come actually to experience them. The human capacity for empathy 
allows us to reconstruct and to feel intimations of experiences that are not our own 
and of which we would otherwise remain innocent. Understanding of non-iterative 
emotional experiences, in ourselves and in others, is possible, though by its nature it is 
only possible by reflection on individual cases, real or imagined. Epistemic generality is 
possible even where ontic generality is lacking. 
12  Styron 1991.  Styron 1991. 
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6. A Hybrid solution?
Part of the interest of Jenefer Robinson’s book is that it seeks to address the distinction 
between basic identification and individuation introduced above. For she in effect pro-
poses a hybrid theory of emotion that manages to incorporate both of these within the 
compass of an emotional response. Robinson offers to show how emotions can start as 
basic pre-cognitive arousals and still emerge as complex differentiated responses. As I 
understand it, her proposal could be reconstructed as follows: suppose someone ap-
proaches impending league-table results with a clear grasp of how very acutely these 
results will affect him. That background defines particular outcomes as zero-sum fail-
ure or triumph, a simple brutal fact either way: dashed vs. redeemed. Hearing the fateful 
number jolts and discomposes him in a sharply valenced way (“NO!!” or “YES !!” as 
the case may be). But this primal visceral surge of disappointment (or of joyful release) 
can be followed, even while he still palpitates with it, by modulating reflections of a 
higher order. These might be mollifying rationalisations or further, more sophisticated 
insights into the misfortune at hand, which could show it in a further, perhaps newly 
frame-wrenching light (“And dashed there, too!!”). Thus, there is plenty of room for 
emotion that emerges through processes of primal reaction and reflective adjustment 
to evolve and acquire layering and complexity (as well as fresh bursts of primal force 
along the way). And it is because unfolding emotional responses can ramify in this way 
that, 
If  we  really  want  to  understand  emotions  in  all  their  uniqueness  and 
individuality, if we want to follow the progress of an emotion process as it 
unfolds, if we want to understand how the different elements of the process 
feed into one another and interact, and how the streams of emotional life 
blend and flow into one another, then we would do better to stay away from 
the generalizations of philosophers and psychologists, and turn instead to the 
detailed studies of emotion that we find in great literature. (Robinson 2005, 
p. 99)
There is no doubt that many emotions do involve this cognitive catalysing of sharp 
initial, physically saturated reactions. And overt bodily arousal is indeed sufficient to 
mark off an emotional response from a dispassionate appraisal. Many individuated re-
actions may first present in such inchoate arousals: “The sight of the empty hole made 
his heart leap violently, but the belief that his gold was gone could not come at once 
– only terror, and the eager effort to put an end to terror.”13 But is being thus thrown 
into physical disequilibrium necessary to a response that is genuinely emotional and of 
an individuated kind? The doubts about this are the old ones: there are notable kinds 
of emotion, such as serenity, that are precisely not wrenching. And in any case, many 
kinds of emotion that can wrench us need not and do not always do so. Bitterness or 
13  Eliot 1996, p. 43.  Eliot 1996, p. 43.24
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misery can be quiet. Felt bodily arousal need not enter into the experience of bitterness 
or of misery. I could feel these, even acutely, as I am mindful of my bleak lot or of its 
undeserved background, but without being convulsed by them. Anguish, as well as joy, 
can be quiet. What is true is that I could not be subject to these feelings in any abiding 
way unless I was disposed to physically aroused outbursts of them under circumstances 
that brought things to a head. Eruptions do belong to the dispositional complex of these 
emotions but not to every experience of them. It is not eruptions per se but susceptibil-
ity to them that having these emotions downright entails. The assumption that bodily 
upheaval is the only form that emotional affection can take seems unwarranted.
The importance of this fact becomes clear in Robinson’s discussion of art. One example 
will have to suffice. In her excellent discussion of how emotional involvement is crucial 
to understanding works of art,14 Robinson points to the role of compassion in under-
standing Anna Karenina, in particular the scene of Anna’s visit to her son, whom she 
has abandoned to elope with Vronsky. Robinson quotes from Blum on compassion to 
bring out what comprehending this scene involves. According to Blum,
One  must  be  able  to  reconstruct  imaginatively  what  the  other  person  is 
undergoing. This involves not only imaginatively taking the other person’s 
viewpoint, and involving oneself in the other person’s vision of the world, but 
also having care and concern for that person as a fellow human being.15
There must be an “active regard” for the good of that person, which, since actual as-
sistance is ruled out in the case of fiction, must take the form of “hope and desire for 
the relief of the condition by those in a position to provide it” (Robinson 2004, p. 110). 
Quite so, but let us now ask what having care and concern for a person as a fellow hu-
man being, “as if they were one’s own”, involves? Clearly one must bring more to the 
scene than empathy of a prurient or of the clinically probing kind. One must both 
imagine what she feels and feel for her. Feeling the pity of her plight, however, does not 
require any reference to one’s physiology; nor does it require any actual physiological 
upheaval (even though, again, a vulnerability to this may be involved). It is just not true 
that I must sob or weep, or even exclaim, to grasp and regret the piteousness of Anna’s 
stolen visit to her son or to regret her plight. (It is clearer in the case of Jane Austen 
than in that of Tolstoy that one can be awakened and instructed emotionally quite 
without heavy breathing.) To be sure, somatic markers of pity and sadness doubtlessly 
are measurable at some level even in the sensitive but dry-eyed reader; but these no 
more are the reader’s compassionate grasp of Anna’s plight than the neural realization 
of mathematical thoughts are the contents of these thoughts. In real life, empathy with 
suffering is indeed apt to be physically affecting, especially at its outset. But, again, this 
isn’t necessary: a concerned friend or a therapist may remain calm whilst empathetic 
14  Robinson 2005, ch. 4  Robinson 2005, ch. 4
15  Quoted in Robinson 2005, p. 110. See Blum 1980.  Quoted in Robinson 2005, p. 110. See Blum 1980.D. Pugmire  Emotion and Emotion Science
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and sharply concerned. The occasion may demand just that, a steady, unheaving shoul-
der to lean on.
This glance at Robinson reveals two things. That a realistic picture of many emotive 
responses in adult humans requires the inclusion of complex non-stereotypical kinds of 
thought and that while emotional sensibility may be primed by “fast, dirty” precogni-
tive appraisals, it need not be. 
Both the embodied appraisal theory of emotion and the process that Robinson de-
scribes locate the seed of emotion, and even its heart, in its neurology. The attempt to 
understand emotions as physical processes, those that undoubtedly do sustain them, 
confuses the basis of a capacity with what that capacity is the capacity for. A familiar 
criticism of emotive cognitivists is that judgments of appraisal, even those typical of 
given emotions (“Well, yes, you certainly showed yourself up as a coward”) can be 
made dispassionately, without any emotion.16 There is nothing emotional about affixing 
a predicate to a subject, as such. But one might similarly ask what is emotion-like about 
the activation of pathways in nervous tissue? After all, mathematical thought involves 
that. What, then, qualifies activations in the emotion implementation regions of the 
central nervous system as occurrences of emotion? Not just that they serve to mobilise 
the body to attend and to cope with pressing vital challenges: that happens in the cool-
est fencer or Formula One driver. At least one answer would be that they are such as 
to sustain normative attitudes and states of feeling towards impinging events of con-
cern, especially feelings other than bodily sensations, feelings of emotion. This is not 
to say that feeling is all there is to emotion. However, neural processing capacities that 
couldn’t or didn’t tend to yield up emotional feeling could not be regarded as capaci-
ties of emotion. And feelings are reflected in the ways we construe what is happening 
(“Yuck!”, “Pathetic!”, “The horror, the horror!”, “That look!”, “Can this be me?—How 
alien it feels.”). No normative attitude can be articulated in purely physiological lan-
guage. Any medium (neural or otherwise) in which feeling and normative attitudes was 
realised could amount to a capacity for emotion. 
Where do these considerations leave our approach to emotion? I submit that we are 
now in a position to see three major levels on which emotion can be understood (and 
this might apply to other aspects of mind, such as intention, action and desire):
(1) Emotions undoubtedly arise through biological changes that determine the stag-
ing, layering, valence, and other qualities of emotional responses and our experiences 
of them. Experimental psychology and neuroscience are required to probe these. Al-
though highly (and increasingly) detailed, the form of useful information science can 
give about these hidden somatic dramas is generic, as already suggested.
(2) There is the individuated understanding of particular emotional responses and a 
personalised understanding of some types of emotional response (the sadness of that 
16  See Robinson 2005, p. 15.  See Robinson 2005, p. 15.26
loss; the love I bear her). This cannot be registered and understood without reference 
to introspection and to relevant niceties of personal history and social intercourse. Re-
course to reflective experience and even to the amplification of its possibilities in art 
seems required for this.
So, there are roles for science and for “intuitive” reflection. We might now want to ask 
what role, if any, is there for philosophy?
(3) It does not seem that just anything could intelligibly or sanely be felt about just 
anything, as suggested earlier. So there may indeed be conceptual structure to emo-
tions (e.g., gratitude presumes certain things about the intentions behind received be-
nevolence; hope supposes that there is a future and one in which certain things are at 
least possible). This gives emotions the dimension of rationality which has so transfixed 
cognitivists. Some emotions also have normative aspects: emotions can be unworthy 
or morbid, for instance, or they can be well-formed flourishings. (Jealousy is pathetic 
and diminishing; resentment is sometimes abject, sometimes not.) Furthermore, there 
can be complexities to emotions that involve both conceptual and normative factors. 
These features of emotion, the conceptual, the normative, and their entwinings, have a 
certain generality. However this is not the generality of science, for it must, like com-
mon understanding and art, draw in part on what our experience of emotions is like. It 
is left to philosophy to undertake this.
knowing lots of things about emotions is not always the same as understanding them. 
And the second and third of the above three ways of understanding them require ref-
erence to the felt and intentional aspects of emotion. Let the following sample (from 
Bernard Williams’ Shame and Necessity) stand as a reminder that the language in which 
emotions are best understood is not always the language of science:
Shame looks to what I am…Even where it is certainly concerned with an action, 
it may be a matter of discovery to the agent, and a difficult discovery, what the 
source of shame is, whether it is to be found in the intention, the action or 
an outcome…Just because shame can be obscure in this kind of way, we can 
fruitfully work to make it more perspicuous, and to understand how a certain 
action or thought stands to ourselves, to what we are and to what realistically 
we can want ourselves to be. If we come to understand our shame, we may 
also better understand our guilt. The structures of shame contain the possibility 
of controlling and learning from our guilt, because they give a conception of 
one’s ethical identity, in relation to which guilt can make sense. Shame can 
understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself. (Williams 1993, p. 93)
Sometimes the proper study of emotion will indeed move outside the frame of our 
actual experience of emotions to supplement the voice of emotion itself, as emotion 
science does, but it can never hope to replace that.
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